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Abstract 
This paper provides new estimates of efficient emission fees for sulfur dioxide (SO2) and 
nitrogen oxides (NOX) emissions in the U.S. electricity sector.  The estimates are obtained by 
coupling a detailed simulation model of the U.S. electricity markets with an integrated 
assessment model that links changes in emissions with atmospheric transport, environmental 
endpoints, and valuation of impacts. Efficient fees are found by comparing incremental benefits 
with emission fee levels. National quantity caps that are equivalent to these fees also are 
computed, and found to approximate caps under consideration in the current multi-pollutant 
debate in the U.S. Congress and the recent proposals from the Bush administration for the 
electricity industry.  We also explore whether regional differentiation of caps on different 
pollutants is likely to enhance efficiency. 
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Efficient Emission Fees in the U.S. Electricity Sector 
Spencer Banzhaf, Dallas Burtraw, and Karen Palmer∗ 
1.  Introduction 
The electricity sector is a major contributor to emissions of NOx, SO2, mercury, and CO2 
in the United States.  This sector faces the prospect of having to make substantial reductions in 
the emissions of the first three of these pollutants over the next 10 to 15 years in order to comply 
with anticipated new U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations related to fine 
particulates, regional haze, and hazardous air pollutants.  As an alternative to this expected 
cavalcade of regulations, some members of congress and the Bush administration have proposed 
plans for capping emissions of these three pollutants from the electricity sector at levels 
substantially below current emissions.  This multi-pollutant cap-and-trade approach is intended 
to provide some regulatory certainty to the industry by creating a timetable now for future 
reductions.  By regulating multiple pollutants simultaneously, this approach would allow firms to 
efficiently allocate their emission reduction activities across different pollutants and to take 
advantage of synergies in pollution reduction.  Also, this approach would provide firms with the 
flexibility to achieve aggregate emission reduction goals at low cost. 
A central question that arises when designing a multi-pollutant cap-and-trade policy is at 
what levels the emission caps should be set.  Principles of economic efficiency suggest that the 
cap on emissions of each pollutant should be set at the level where the marginal benefit of further 
emission reductions is equal to the marginal cost of obtaining those reductions.  An alternative 
approach is an emission fee that is set to equal marginal emission damages at that point.  This 
strategy has the same efficiency implications as the cap-and-trade strategy in which emission 
allowances are auctioned to firms, but different implications for efficiency and the allocation of 
rents relative to a trading program that distributes emission allowances for free (Burtraw et al. 
2001a).   
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In this paper, we seek to identify second-best efficient emission fees for NOx and SO2 in 
the electricity sector.  The estimates are second-best because we take as given many aspects of 
regulatory and fiscal policy that preclude ideal solutions, and search for the efficient fees within 
this institutional setting.  The estimates are obtained by coupling a detailed simulation model of 
the U.S. electricity markets with an integrated assessment model that links changes in emissions 
with atmospheric transport, environmental endpoints, and valuation of impacts.  Efficient fees 
are found by solving the electricity model under different values for the emission fees and 
finding the associated value of the marginal damages associated with the resulting level of 
emissions for each pollutant.  This methodology allows us to estimate the marginal damages and 
marginal abatement costs for different emission levels and then to approximate the optimal fee or 
range of fees where the marginal cost (emission fee) is equal to the marginal emission damages.  
It also allows us to estimate emissions at these tax levels.  Because of the duality of the price and 
quantity instruments, the resulting emissions levels can be interpreted as the efficient permit 
caps, and can be compared to current legislative proposals.   
We find that the efficient emission fee for SO2 is between $4,700 and $1,800 per ton, 
which will yield between 0.9 and 3.1 million tons of emissions in the year 2010.  (All values are 
in 1999 dollars.)  For NOx, the best estimate of the efficient emission tax lies between $1,200 and 
$700 per ton, which yields emissions between 1.0 and 2.8 million tons.  These results suggest 
that the emission caps included in the Bush administration and congressional proposals are 
within the range of emissions that can be supported by current knowledge.  We also find there is 
substantial regional variation in the benefits achieved by reducing pollution, suggesting that a 
regionally differentiated policy could yield greater net benefits than a uniform national policy. 
2.  Policy Context and Prior Research 
Twelve years after the passage of Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and 
the first federal cap-and-trade program for a major air pollutant, policymakers in Washington are 
considering another round of cap-and-trade regulations for the electricity sector that would 
dramatically reduce its emissions of several pollutants.  Two proposals are currently in play. 
Senate Bill 556, which was introduced into the Senate in March of 2001 by Senator 
Jeffords (I-VT), proposes to cap annual emissions of NOx and SO2 from the electricity sector at 
25% of their 1997 levels; annual emissions of mercury would be capped at 10% of 1999 levels 
by 2007.  This is equivalent to annual caps of about 1.5 million tons for NOx, 2.25 million tons Resources for the Future  Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer 
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for SO2, and 5 tons for mercury.  The bill also caps annual electricity sector emissions of CO2 at 
1990 levels beginning in 2008. The bill allows for emissions trading for all gases except 
mercury. 
The second plan is the Bush administration’s “Clear Skies” proposal, which was 
introduced in the House by Rep. Barton (R-TX) (HR5266) and in the Senate by Sen. Smith (R-
NH) (SB 2815) in July 2002.  The proposal caps annual emissions of SO2 at 4.5 million tons in 
2010 and at 3.0 million tons in 2018; annual emissions of NOx at 2.1 million tons in 2008 and 1.7 
million tons in 2018; and annual emissions of mercury at 26 tons in 2010 and 15 tons in 2018.1  
This proposal permits the trading of emission allowances for all three pollutants.  
In addition to the emission caps, the bills differ on other important issues.  For example, 
S556 requires that all plants, when more than 40 years old, must come into compliance with new 
source performance standards by installing "best available control technologies."  Over time, this 
technology-based standard would likely become more binding than the emissions caps.  In 
contrast, the Bush administration proposal has been linked by many in the administration with a 
phase-out of the technology-based standards already present in the Clean Air Act ("New Source 
Review").  Thus, in addition to the targets and timetables, there are important institutional 
differences that affect the bills’ cost-effectiveness for any given target.  We address only the 
question of the efficient target and not other issues associated with timing or implementation. 
Several states also have passed or are considering laws limiting emissions of some or all 
of the same pollutants from electricity generators.  Most of these laws or proposals, such as new 
regulations in Connecticut and Massachusetts that limit non-ozone season emissions of NOx, are 
formulated as limits on emission rates.  The largest state action is in North Carolina, which has 
recently placed emissions caps on its largest coal-fired plants.  A similar plan has been adopted 
in New Hampshire for all existing fossil fuel generators. 
Relative to the status quo, the S556 and the Bush administration proposals envision 
similarly restrictive caps on national annual emissions of NOx and SO2 once the proposals are 
fully implemented, although the timing for achieving the reductions varies. Nonetheless, the 
similarity in the level of emission reductions suggests a degree of political consensus on how 
                                                 
1 The Clear Skies initiative does not include a cap on CO2 emissions, but instead proposes to cut greenhouse gas 
intensity on an economy-wide basis by 18% over the next 10 years using mostly voluntary initiatives and providing 
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tightly to set the caps.  However, the appropriate level for caps is a fundamental empirical 
question that economists have not studied closely.   
In the past decade, economists have conducted a number of studies of the benefits of 
additional controls as well as the costs of controlling different pollutants.  Most policy research 
has used a transfer methodology to estimate benefits, in which existing estimates of health 
effects and values are applied to a new context.2  In one example, the recent benefit-cost analyses 
of the Clean Air Act (U.S. EPA 1997a, 1999) estimates benefits on a national scale, but reports 
only total benefits from the improvements induced by the act, rather than the schedule of 
estimated benefits, making it impossible to know the efficient level of emission reduction.  
Others have estimated only regional damages from specific power plants (Desvousges et al.1998, 
Rowe et al. 1995, Harrison et al. 1993, and Thayer et al. 1994).  Thus, there is room for 
improving our understanding of the national picture of the benefits of large changes in pollution. 
With respect to costs, Carlson et al. (2000) econometrically estimate the cost of SO2 
emission reductions and the cost savings from allowance trading under the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments, and Ellerman et al. (2000) provide similar estimates based on a survey of industry 
costs.  Burtraw et al. (2001) and U.S. EPA (1998a) estimate the costs of achieving the 
summertime reductions in NOx emissions that would be required in the so-called “NOx SIP Call 
Program” scheduled to take effect in 2004 in 19 eastern states.  U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) (2001a, 2001b) and EPA (2001) provide detailed analysis of the cost of 
proposals that resemble S556, but do not assess benefits. 
Despite the tremendous importance of such information, few studies have attempted to 
actually compare benefits and costs of pollution reduction.  Boyd et al. (1995) analyzed benefits 
and costs together in a general equilibrium model, with a single, constant value for the per-ton 
benefits of pollution abatement based on EPA regulatory analyses that are now more than 15 
years old.  Burtraw et al. (1998) used an integrated assessment, partial equilibrium model to 
estimate the benefits and costs of Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments that imposed 
reductions on SO2 and NOx and initiated emissions trading for SO2. In contrast, we use a much 
                                                 
2 Other research has used revealed preference methods to infer household willingness to pay from housing markets 
using hedonic price regressions, discrete choice models, and equilibrium sorting models.  See Smith and Huang 
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more detailed model of the electricity sector to calculate emission changes and costs, and an 
update of the same integrated assessment method to estimate household benefits.  EPA (1997a, 
1999) provides a benefit-cost analysis of the Clean Air Act, and a recent analysis of the benefits 
and costs of the Bush administration proposals (2002).  But again, the EPA studies report only 
total net benefits from the improvements induced by the act, rather than the schedule of 
estimated benefits costs, making it impossible to evaluate the improvements from policy 
changes. 
In addition to estimating the efficient level of emissions nationally, this research also can 
identify the regions of the country whose emissions contribute the highest marginal damages, 
and where benefits would be experienced.  Geographic differences speak to two aspects of the 
current policy debate.  First, they are relevant to the problem of "hot spots," in which the 
flexibility of permit trading could allow pollution to concentrate in a densely populated area.3 
Second, the geographic differences raise the question of whether the caps should be national or 
regional in scope.  The current proposals differ in their treatment of this issue.  Under the Clear 
Skies Initiative there would be separate eastern and western regional trading zones for NOx, but a 
single national cap for SO2.  The justification for the distinction is that large reductions in NOx 
emissions are necessary in the eastern states to protect human health, while the overall level of 
emissions and possible reductions are smaller in the west.  The regional cap will prevent 
migration of emissions to the west and protect health and visibility improvements.  Inter-regional 
trading would not be allowed.  In S556, emissions of NOx face a uniform national cap, but SO2 
emissions are subject to different caps in the east and west.  This difference arises largely from 
efforts to honor a recent agreement reached among states in the Western Regional Air 
Partnership to reduce emissions of SO2 to combat visibility problems in the west.  Our analysis 
focuses on the range of human health benefits resulting from reduced emissions and considers if 
moving from a uniform national policy to one with multiple trading regions is likely to increase 
net benefits. 
                                                 
3 Previous research about trading under the SO2 program has found no hot spot problem (Burtraw and Mansur, 
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3.  The Models 
The study employs two distinct modeling components.  First, the "Haiku" electricity 
model simulates electricity consumption, generation, and associated emissions of NOx, SO2, and 
CO2.  The resulting emissions of NOx and SO2 feed into an integrated assessment model of 
atmospheric transport and environmental effects called the Tracking and Analysis Framework 
(TAF).  This model computes the health benefits attributable to the different emissions profiles 
associated with each Pigouvian tax. 
3.1  Haiku Model Description 
The Haiku model simulates equilibrium in regional electricity markets and inter-regional 
electricity trade with an integrated algorithm for SO2 and NOX emission control technology 
choice.4  The model calculates electricity demand, electricity prices, the composition of 
electricity supply, inter-regional electricity trading activity, and emissions of key pollutants such 
as NOX, SO2, CO2, and mercury from electricity generation.  The model solves for the quantity 
and price of electricity delivered in 13 regions, for four time periods (super-peak, peak, shoulder, 
and baseload hours) in each of three seasons (summer, winter, and spring/fall).  For each of these 
156 segments, demand is aggregated from three customer classes: residential, industrial, and 
commercial.  Supply is aggregated from the complete set of electricity plants in the United 
States, which for modeling purposes are aggregated into 48 representative plants in each region.  
Investment in new generation capacity and retirement of existing facilities are determined 
endogenously in a dynamic framework, based on capacity-related costs of providing service in 
the future (“going forward costs”).  Generator dispatch in the model is based on the minimization 
of short run variable costs of generation. 
Inter-regional power trading is identified as the level of trading necessary to equilibrate 
regional electricity prices (accounting for transmission costs and power losses).  These inter-
regional transactions are constrained by the assumed level of available inter-regional 
transmission capability as reported by the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC).  
                                                 
4 Haiku was developed by RFF and has been used for a number of reports and articles that appear in the peer-
reviewed literature.  The model has been compared with other simulation models as part of two series of meetings of 
Stanford University’s Energy Modeling Forum (Energy Modeling Forum 1998, 2001). Resources for the Future  Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer 
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Factor prices, such as the cost of capital and labor, are held constant.  Fuel price forecasts are 
calibrated to match EIA price forecasts for 2002 (U.S. EIA 2002).  Fuel market modules for coal 
and natural gas calculate prices that are responsive to factor demand.  Coal is differentiated along 
several dimensions, including fuel quality and location of supply, and both coal and natural gas 
prices are differentiated by point of delivery.  All other fuel prices are specified exogenously. 
For control of SO2, coal burning model plants are distinguished by the presence or 
absence of flue gas desulfurization (scrubbers).  Unscrubbed coal plants have the option to add a 
retrofit SO2 scrubber, and all plants select from a series of coal types that vary by sulfur content 
and price as a strategy to reduce SO2 emissions. For control of NOx, each plant solves for the 
least costly post-combustion investment from the options of selective catalytic reduction (SCR) 
and selective noncatalytic reduction and reburn. The variable costs of emission controls plus the 
opportunity cost of emission allowances under cap-and-trade programs are added to the variable 
cost of generation when establishing the operation of different types of generation capacity. 
Utilization of each plant is flexible and demand also may respond to changes in price in order to 
help achieve emission reductions. 
3.2  TAF Description 
The output of the Haiku model is emissions of each pollutant by a representative plant 
within each of 13 NERC subregions.  The emissions are allocated to actual plant locations 
(latitude and longitude) based on an algorithm that reflects historic utilization and the expected 
location of new investment.  Changes in emissions of SO2 and NOX that result from the policies 
are aggregated to the state level and fed into TAF, a nonproprietary and peer-reviewed integrated 
assessment model (Bloyd et al., 1996).5  TAF integrates pollutant transport and deposition 
(including formation of secondary particulates but excluding ozone), human health effects, and 
valuation of these effects at the state level.  Although our version of the model limits benefits 
only to particulate-related health impacts, these impacts account for the vast majority of all 
benefits according to the major integrated assessment studies of the impacts of electricity 
                                                 
5 TAF was developed to support the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP).  Each module of 
TAF was constructed and refined by a group of experts in that field, and draws primarily on peer-reviewed literature 
to construct the integrated model.  TAF was subject to an extensive peer review in December 1995, which 
concluded "TAF represent[s] a major advancement in our ability to perform integrated assessments." (ORNL, 1995.)  
The entire model is available at www.lumina.com\taflist.  Resources for the Future  Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer 
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generation (Krupnick and Burtraw, 1996) and according to the other models cited in the previous 
section. 
Pollution transport is estimated from seasonal source-receptor matrices that are a 
reduced-form version of the Advanced Source Trajectory Regional Air Pollution model, which 
uses 11 years of wind and precipitation data to estimate the variability of model results on the 
basis of climatological variability.  In aggregating to the state level, the source-receptor matrix is 
calibrated to represent average effects observed in more disaggregate models.  The model 
captures atmospheric chemistry as NOx and SO2 react to form nitrates and sulfates, which are 
constituents of particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter (PM10).  It estimates 
concentrations of these separate constituents of PM10 plus residual NO2 and SO2. 
Health effects are characterized as changes in health status predicted to result from 
changes in air pollution concentrations.  Effects are expressed as the number of days of acute 
morbidity effects of various types, the number of chronic disease cases, and the number of 
statistical lives lost.  The health module is based on concentration-response functions found in 
the peer-reviewed literature, including epidemiological articles reviewed in EPA’s Criteria 
Documents that, in turn, appear in key EPA cost-benefit analyses (U.S. EPA, 1997a; U.S. EPA, 
1999).  The health effects modeled include, for particulates, premature mortality, chronic 
bronchitis, chronic cough, acute bronchitis cases, upper respiratory symptoms, cough episodes, 
and croup; for SO2, they include chest discomfort and cough episodes; and for NO2, they include 
eye irritation and upper respiratory symptoms.   
Of these effects, mortality effects are the most important.  To characterize these effects 
we use a cross sectional study by Pope et al. (1995).  While this study and others have 
documented the separate effects of PM10, PM2.5 and sulfates (a constituent of PM2.5) on mortality, 
none have documented the specific effect of nitrates. Accordingly, we use the separate Pope et 
al. estimates for the potency of sulfates, but assume that nitrates have the potency of the average 
PM10 particle. 
TAF assigns monetary values (taken from the environmental economics literature) to the 
health-effects estimates produced by the health-effects module.  The benefits are totaled to obtain 
annual health benefits for each year modeled.  For the most important aspect, the valuation of a 
statistical life, we have used an estimate of $2.25 million (1999 dollars) from a recent meta-
analysis by Mrozek and Taylor (2002) of 203 hedonic labor-market estimates.  This estimate is 
somewhat lower than that used in most previous work and less than half of the $6.1 million 
estimate used by EPA (1997a, 1999).  The most important reason for this discrepancy is the Resources for the Future  Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer 
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attribution of wage rate differentials to mortality rate differences in previous studies cited by 
EPA, while Mrozek and Taylor attribute a larger portion of the wage rate differentials to inter-
industry differences that occur for other reasons.6   
As with past research, values for chronic morbidity effects (e.g., emphysema) are 
transferred from individual studies, often using a conservative cost-of-illness approach.  Values 
for acute effects are predicted from the meta-analysis of Johnson et al. (1997), which synthesized 
contingent valuation studies of morbidity effects based on their severity according to a health-
status index and other variables.   
3.3  Iterative Algorithm 
Using these models, we apply successive emission fees for SO2 and NOx to the U.S. 
electricity sector.7 For each level of the fee, we use the Haiku model to estimate the response in 
electricity markets and the emission levels of each pollutant.  Since profit-maximizing firms set 
their marginal cost of abatement equal to the emission fees, the resulting schedule is the marginal 
cost of abatement.  We approximate the marginal cost curve by linearly interpolating the 
abatement levels between each successive pair of marginal costs. 
The TAF model estimates the total damages from pollution at each fee level.  As the fee 
is increased by one increment, emissions and damages decrease, giving the incremental benefits 
                                                 
6 There may be other reasons to suspect that the traditional values are too high.  Labor market studies rely on the 
preferences of prime-age, healthy working males facing immediate and accidental risks of workplace mortality.  In 
contrast, particulate pollution primarily affects seniors and people with impaired health status, and may occur years 
after initial exposure.  This recognition has led to attempts to estimate values for life extensions (Johnson et al., 
1998) and future risks (Alberini et al., 2002).  New surveys that use contingent valuation to describe mortality risk 
reductions in a more realistic health context and that are applied to people of different ages and health status, find 
that the implied VSLs are far smaller than EPA's estimates, particularly for future risk reductions (Alberini et al, 
2002). However, the effects do not appear to be strongly related to age and, although many conjecture that poor 
health status would reduce willingness to pay, the study finds people in ill health tend to be willing to pay more for 
mortality risk reductions than people in good health.  On the other hand, effects of dread and lack of controllability 
have not yet been factored into these new analyses. 
7 Specifically, for the case of NOx, we set marginal costs at $0; $700-$1,500 in increments of $100; $1,700; $1,900; 
$2,200; and $2,500, with the SO2 tax held at $3,000.  For the case of SO2, we set marginal costs at $0; $500-$2,000 
in increments of $500; $2,400; $2,600-$4,100 in increments of $1,000; and $4,500-$6,500 in increments of $500, 
with the NOx tax held at $900.  The points were chosen to provide the most precision around the likely intersection 
of the marginal benefits curve, with less data in the tails. Resources for the Future  Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer 
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of the emission reductions.  Thus, we similarly trace a marginal benefit curve, estimated as a step 
function with marginal benefits averaged over each incremental change in emissions. 
The intersection of these two curves is a static estimate of the second-best efficient level 
of pollution taxes or caps.  This interpretation requires two important caveats.  Although the 
electricity model provides a multi-year simulation, we estimate the efficient level of pollution in 
a single year (2010). The cost curve is derived dynamically under the assumption that pollution 
levels are constant over time.  This level may not be consistent with the optimal path of pollution 
over time, since achieving it may require high costs relative to benefits in other years.  While the 
ideal information would be the optimal dynamic path of pollution levels over time, such 
information is beyond the scope of this research.  Second, the level of pollution estimated is 
second-best in the sense of being conditional on a single, national policy instrument.  However, it 
also ignores consideration of market structure that would adjust the Pigouvian estimate to 
account for differences between price and marginal cost (Burtraw et al. 1997, Burtraw and 
Krupnick 1997). 
3.4  Description of Uncertainty Analysis 
All of the parameters used in these models are subject to uncertainty.  On the benefits 
side, we quantify this uncertainty by using not only the point estimates of the concentration-
response functions and valuation functions, but also the estimated standard errors.  We use 
Monte Carlo methods to simulate a 90% confidence interval for benefits at each level of 
emissions, drawing repeatedly from distribution of parameters.  In addition, we perform 
sensitivity analyses of the most important subjective judgments, such as the concentration-
response function for mortality effects and the choice of the value of a statistical life; these 
results are given below.  Unfortunately, the Haiku model of the electricity sector is too 
computationally intensive to allow a similar assessment of uncertainty on the production side.  
Thus, we report only the most-likely estimate of the marginal cost of abatement function. Resources for the Future  Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer 
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4.  Results 
Figure 1 illustrates our approach.  It shows the estimated marginal cost and marginal 
benefit curves for SO2 over a small range of abatement (7.75 million tons to 8.25 million tons), 
when NOx taxes are held at $900.  For each level of the emissions tax, emissions are directly 
observed and presented in terms of abatement relative to an assumed baseline.8 
The most striking feature of the figure is that, while marginal costs are relatively smooth 
and upward sloping (as expected), the marginal benefits are erratic.  The behavior of the 
marginal benefits curve follows from the fact that, as the tax on emissions increases, the 
contribution to abatement at the margin comes from different plants in different geographic 
locations.  For example, over some range of taxes, a southern plant may be at the margin, over 
another range, an eastern plant may be at the margin.  These differences, in turn, have 
implications for benefits estimation because the exposed population differs. 
In principle, the nonconvexity of benefits creates some difficulty in finding the efficient 
point since, rather than comparing marginal benefits and marginal costs, one must compare total 
benefits and total costs to find an optimum.  However, while we have no doubt that such jumps 
exist in the schedule of benefits from national pollution abatement, the precise locations of the 
jumps are almost certainly an artifact of the model.  Accordingly, it is more appropriate to focus 
on the trend in benefits as emissions are decreased.  Consequently, we smooth the marginal 
benefit and marginal cost curves using a nonparametric, locally linear regression technique.   
Figures 2a and 2b show the smooth estimated marginal benefits and marginal cost curves, 
with the 90% confidence intervals on the benefits curve, for SO2 and NOx reductions, 
respectively.9  In each of these figures, the horizontal axis ends at a point equal to the total 
amount of emissions of the relevant pollutant in the baseline in 2010.  These figures form the 
                                                 
8 As a baseline, we assume implementation of the summertime NOx SIP Call trading program in 2004 in 19 eastern 
states and the continuation of the Title IV SO2 cap-and-trade program.  We assume no additional regulations 
affecting mercury or CO2 and no additional enforcement of new source review beyond settlements already 
announced.  We assume limited restructuring of the electricity sector with retail competition in about half of the 
country. 
9 In Figure 2a, the NOx fee is held constant at $900.  In Figure 2b, the SO2 fee is held constant at $3,000. The basic 
pattern in these figures, and the conclusions below about optimal emissions caps, are not susceptible to the choice of 
fee for the other pollutant nor to the bandwidth in the smoothing function.   Resources for the Future  Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer 
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core of the analysis.  We use them to discuss, in turn, the efficient level of abatement, regional 
differences and other patterns in benefits, and the factors contributing to the costs of abatement. 
4.1  Efficient Tax Levels 
The central issue of the analysis is the efficient level of pollution abatement.  In the case 
of SO2 (Figure 2a), the central estimate of marginal benefits equal marginal costs at $3500, or 
about 1.1 million tons of national SO2 emissions in the year 2010 (8 million tons of abatement).  
The uncertainty introduced on the benefits side would suggest a range from about $1800 to 
$4700, or 0.9 million tons to 3.1 million tons of SO2 emissions.  By comparison, the Jeffords and 
Bush administration proposals ultimately would limit emissions to about 2.25 million and 3 
million tons respectively.  Thus, the aggressive targets in these proposals appear to be well 
justified from the perspective of economic efficiency.  Indeed, the proposed emission levels are 
at the higher end of the range estimated by our research, and the most-likely estimate suggests 
that an efficient target would be even more stringent than these proposals. 
Figure 2b illustrates the marginal benefits and marginal costs of reducing NOx emissions.  
Uncertainty in the benefits measures induces an estimated range of efficient emission fees 
between $700 and $1200, or emission levels between 1.0 million tons and 2.8 million tons.  
Thus, at 1.5 and 2.1 million tons respectively, both the Jeffords and Bush proposals are within 
the range of emissions that can be supported by current knowledge.    However, the figure shows 
that both the marginal benefit and cost curves are fairly flat and move together over a range of 
data, making the precise placement uncertain.  Marginal costs intersect our most-likely estimate 
of marginal benefits at $800 and 2.6 million tons of emissions, in a trough in the marginal 
benefits curve.  Discounting this trough and using the right-hand side of the overlapping range 
would yield an efficient point of $1100 and 1.3 million tons of emissions.  In the discussions that 
follow, such as the abatement technologies utilized under these policies, we use this latter point 
as the most likely efficient tax level for NOx.  While an argument could be made for any point in 
this range, the potential importance of other effects from NOx pollution such as ozone formation, 
acid deposition, and impacts on agriculture and silviculture, which were omitted from our formal 
analysis, suggest leaning toward the more stringent side of the range.10   
                                                 
10 U.S. EPA (1998b) estimates benefits to agriculture and silviculture from reduced NOx emissions to be $325 and 
from reduced acid deposition to be $300 per ton.   Resources for the Future  Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer 
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4.2  Benefits 
As shown in the figures, after smoothing, the marginal benefits curves are fairly flat for 
both pollutants.  This pattern should be interpreted with caution, however, since, for any given 
improvement in local air pollution, the model uses linear approximations for the reduction in 
health effects and constant per-health-effect economic values.  Thus, by construction, any given 
source of pollution must have near-constant marginal benefits of abatement (although seasonal 
variation in the timing of emissions is more relevant in the model due to differences in 
atmospheric transport of pollution over seasons).  However, the pattern suggests that, while there 
may be abrupt shifts in the source of pollution over small ranges of the data (Figure 1), there is 
no long-term trend across regions of the country that affects aggregate benefits. 
4.2.1 Regional Differences 
On a disaggregated basis, however, differences in benefits within and between regions 
bear further scrutiny.  Figure 3 illustrates the sum of benefits that accrue everywhere in the 
nation for a reduction in 1 ton of SO2 emissions from each state measured against the baseline.  
Changes in emissions in California, the Carolinas, Tennessee, and Kentucky are the most potent 
with respect to economic benefits because they lead to changes in exposure for a large 
population.  In contrast, emissions in the western states (save California) have the lowest 
impacts.  These differences in the geographic location of the marginal source of emission 
reductions at each level of emission fee account for the large shifts in marginal benefits 
illustrated in Figure 1 prior to smoothing the benefits function.   
Figure 3 also illustrates the potential usefulness of segregating the emission allowance 
trading market into separate regions (Kolstad 1987).  The natural divide separating the relative 
harm to public health from emissions in the east and west due to differences in population 
density suggest that one would want to design a policy that incurred appropriately scaled 
marginal costs.  On efficiency grounds, a region with large marginal benefits from emission 
reductions would justify high marginal costs associated with a strict target, while other regions 
might be assigned a more relaxed emission target.  To a small degree, the Jeffords and Bush 
administration proposals both make an effort to accommodate these differences in idiosyncratic 
ways by imposing regionally specific caps (albeit each does so for only one of the pollutants).  
The welfare improvement that results from relaxing the restriction of a national standard to two 
or more standards remains an open empirical question. Resources for the Future  Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer 
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In addition to geographical differences in the source of emissions, the geographical 
differences in the recipient of damages/benefits remain an important political issue.  One 
criticism of cap-and-trade approaches to pollution abatement is that, without additional 
constraints, a cluster of pollution sources may become net purchasers of pollution permits, 
thereby increasing pollution concentrations in some areas and creating pollution "hot spots," as 
discussed previously.  Figure 4 shows the reduction in SO2 emissions in each state as a result of 
adopting the efficient SO2 cap of 1.1 million tons.  All states would reduce emissions, with the 
largest reductions occurring in the industrial Midwest, North Carolina, and Texas.  More to the 
point, Figure 5 shows the change in predicted PM10 concentrations in each state resulting from 
these reduced emissions.  (For both figures, the pattern is virtually identical for the NOx cap.)  
The figure shows there are no predicted increases in concentrations in any state, and the mid-
Atlantic states would enjoy the greatest improvement in air quality, with the northeast, midwest, 
and southeast states also enjoying large changes.  The figure also can be thought of as 
approximating per-capita health benefits since (for a constant mix of demographic groups) such 
benefits are proportionate to air quality improvements.   
4.2.2 Uncertainty 
The results presented above quantify the uncertainty from sampling error in the 
transferred parameter estimates.  However, there also is a broader form of uncertainty in the 
choice of model used in these studies, such as the relationship between particulate concentrations 
and health status.  To assess this uncertainty, we perform additional sensitivity analyses.  First 
we consider the consequences of transferring alternative concentration-response relationships 
between particulates and mortality.  For example, if instead of using a separate estimate for 
sulfates we had used the same concentration-response for all particulates (still from the cross-
sectional Pope et al. 1995 study), average per-ton SO2 benefits would have been 9% lower (NOx 
benefits being unchanged).  On the other hand, if we had used one of the many time-series 
studies, per ton benefits of abatement would have been much lower.  For example, using the 
concentration-response function from a meta analysis of 13 studies reported in Desvousges et al. 
(1998, Ch. 4), per ton benefits would have been 57% lower for SO2 and 30% lower for NOx.  
This adjustment would lead to optimal SO2 emissions of 5.5 million tons, much higher than the 
central estimates, and NOx emissions of 2.8 million tons, still within the 90% confidence 
interval.   Resources for the Future  Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer 
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Second, we consider the consequences of transferring alternative values of a statistical 
life from other studies.  As noted above, the Mrozak and Taylor meta analysis of labor market 
studies estimates a fairly low value of about $2.25 million.  In contrast, using EPA's value of 
$6.1 million would have more than doubled the per-ton benefits for both SO2 and NOx.  For both 
pollutants, the higher value for a statistical life would put the best estimate of the efficient level 
of emissions at approximately the low end of the 90% confidence interval discussed above (more 
precisely, at 0.7 million tons SO2 emissions and 1.0 million tons NOx emissions).  Thus—with 
the exception of the SO2 emissions consistent with the time-series mortality estimates—the 
respective 90% confidence intervals approximately bracket the ranges induced by any of these 
subjective judgments.   
4.3  Costs 
There are three ways to imagine that emission reductions can be achieved.  One is the 
installation of post-combustion controls, or through process changes at the power plant 
(abatement).  The second is a change in the choice of fuel for electricity generation (input 
substitution).  The third is a reduction in total generation and electricity consumption (output 
substitution). 
SO2 emissions are reduced using all three methods.  Table 1 reports values for several 
variables under the efficient policy, including the efficient SO2 and NOx emission fees, and the 
percentage change in these variables from the baseline.  The efficient fee of $3,500 per ton SO2 
causes the installation of more than 160,000 MW of additional retrofit scrubbers.  Most of this 
capacity comes in at fee prices above $1,000 per ton and basically all of this capacity is already 
installed with a fee of $2,600 per ton in the model.  Note that in Figure 2a, after the fee reaches 
$2,600, the marginal cost curve becomes markedly steeper, suggesting additional controls are not 
economically feasible and tax payments increase more rapidly instead.  Under the efficient 
policy, the annual cost of the controls is about $7.5 billion. 
There also is a significant amount of shifting from high- to low-sulfur coal, which plays 
an especially important role for fees less than $1,000 per ton. Figure 6 illustrates the quantity of 
delivered coal for electricity generation at each level of the SO2 fee. Between 0 and $1,000 fees, 
the amount of low-sulfur coal used almost doubles to substitute for high-sulfur coal. Also, there 
is a small increase in the total tonnage of delivered coal because low-sulfur coal has a lower heat 
content per ton. The baseline quantity of low sulfur coal (not shown in the figure) is one-third of Resources for the Future  Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer 
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the way from the level observed at $0 and the level observed at $1,000, reflecting the incentives 
of the existing SO2 emissions cap under Title IV.  
At an emission fee greater than $1,000, where there is significant investment in retrofit 
scrubbers, there also is an incentive to revert to using higher-sulfur coal.  Scrubbers remove 
about 95% of the SO2 emissions and, given this removal efficiency, it is less worthwhile to pay 
the higher price for low-sulfur coal.  However, by the time the fee reaches $3,000, the 
opportunities for installing scrubbers is exhausted (Figure 2a) and further reductions must be 
achieved by switching again to low sulfur coal, even at units with SO2 scrubbers.  The efficient 
fee policy with a SO2 fee of $3,500 would lead to consumption of about 1 billion tons of low-
sulfur coal.  
The switching between coal and natural gas begins to be potent at $1,000 per ton, which 
is the point where switching among coal types (from high to low sulfur coal) becomes 
insufficient for compliance.  Figure 7 illustrates the percent change in generation from coal, 
natural gas, and the change in total generation for a wide range of SO2 fees compared to the 
baseline.11  At the efficient fee, coal-fired generation is at 93% of its level in the baseline, while 
gas-fired generation is at 115% of its baseline level (see also Table 1). The elasticity of coal’s 
share of total generation with respect to the SO2 fee is –0.04.12  The sensitivity of the relative 
factor intensity of coal and natural gas with respect to a change in the SO2 fee is –0.11.  Even 
under the efficient policy, coal-fired generation accounts for roughly half of total generation. 
The third way to achieve emission reductions is through a reduction in total generation, 
which results from an increase in electricity price.  The change in electricity price due to the 
change in the SO2 emission fee is illustrated in Figure 8, with an elasticity of –0.04.  Although a 
response in electricity price is clear, the change in price is small, and thus total generation 
declines by only a small amount, as illustrated previously in Figure 7.  The elasticity of total 
generation with respect to electricity price averages –0.28.  At the efficient fee, total generation 
                                                 
11 As noted previously, the NOx fee is assumed to be $900 per ton for most of the simulations. With a low SO2 fee, 
the generation from coal actually increases relative to the baseline, which includes the SO2 trading program with an 
allowance price of $102/ton in 2010 and the seasonal, regional NOx trading program in the SIP region with 
allowance prices of $1,730 per ton. 
12 All reported elasticity values are average (arc) elasticity estimates over the range from a zero SO2 fee to the 
efficient fee. The coefficient estimates on a constant elasticity function over the same range are very similar. Resources for the Future  Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer 
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is reduced by just over 1% from the baseline level (Table 1), with an elasticity with respect to the 
SO2 fee of –0.01. 
Reductions in NOx emissions are primarily due to the increased utilization of existing 
post-combustion controls and the installation of additional controls, with less of a role for fuel 
switching or demand reduction than occurs with the SO2 fee.  The baseline policy already has a 
substantial amount of post-combustion control in place due to the requirements of the NOx SIP 
Call, but those controls are only run on a seasonal basis.13  The fees we model apply during the 
entire year, leading to year-round utilization of existing controls.  About 108 GW of additional 
post-combustion controls are installed under the efficient policy compared to the baseline.  The 
vast majority of post-combustion NOx controls—roughly 90%—is SCR, and this holds for a 
wide range of fees up to the efficient level of $1,100.  For NOx fees above $1,100, the share of 
NOx controls that is SCR grows to be as high as 95%.  Note again that, after this point, the 
marginal cost of abatement becomes almost vertical in Figure 2b.   
There is very little switching from coal to natural gas as a form of compliance for 
achieving NOx reductions.  Holding the SO2 fee constant, the amount of switching is noisy at 
different levels of the NOx fee but it hovers around 1% of gas-fired generation in the baseline.  
There is little fuel switching to gas because, although gas-fired generation has no SO2 emissions, 
it has only slightly fewer NOx emissions than the controlled rate for coal-fired generation.  Also, 
electricity prices are less responsive to the NOx fee than to the SO2 fee, so there is little change in 
total generation in response to the NOx fee. 
Electricity price includes transmission and distribution costs, which are affected by the 
emission fees in only a small way.  Almost all of the change in electricity price is due to the 
change in generation cost.  While average electricity price increases by 4%, the average 
contribution of generation cost to electricity price increases by 12%.  The SO2 emission fees 
contribute 2.3% to generation cost, and the SO2 emission controls contribute 4.6% to generation 
cost.14  The NOx emission fees contribute just less than 1% of generation cost, and the NOx 
                                                 
13 The utilization, on an annual basis, of NOx controls that exist in the baseline would yield increased net benefits 
compared to the seasonal program (Burtraw et al., 2001b; Burtraw et al., 2002).  
14 The manner in which these items contribute to costs depends on the way prices are set. In regions with regulated 
prices, these items contribute to total costs that are averaged over electricity sales. In regions with competitive 
prices, the electricity price is affected to the degree these costs are incurred by the marginal generator or reserve 
unit. Resources for the Future  Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer 
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emission controls contribute 2.7% of generation cost.  Not all of these costs are new under the 
efficient fee policy because of pre-existing permit trading programs in the baseline and pre-
existing controls for SO2 and NOx.  Roughly speaking, the efficient fees would lead to a doubling 
of the costs of pollution and pollution control in electricity generation.15 
4.3.1 Ancillary Reductions in CO2  
The efficient fees for SO2 and NOx emissions lead to changes in technology and fuel for 
electricity generation, as well as a reduction in demand, that yields ancillary reductions in CO2 
emissions.  We describe these reductions as ancillary because there is no regulation of CO2 in 
this analysis.  
Compared to the baseline, CO2 emissions fall by 4.9% or 152 million short tons in 2010 
(Table 1).  The SO2 emission fee leads to the larger share of emission reductions.  Figure 9 
illustrates the change in CO2 emissions as the SO2 emission fee is increased, holding the NOx 
emission fee constant.  The elasticity of CO2 emissions with respect to the SO2 fee is about -0.04. 
The reductions in CO2 are due to the substitution of natural gas for coal in electricity generation 
and, secondarily, to the reduction in overall electricity demand.  The relationship between CO2 
emissions and the NOx emission fee is noisier, as was the relationship between electricity price 
and the NOx fee. There is, on average, only a modest reduction in CO2, because there is little 
change in electricity price and overall demand, and little change in the choice of fuel as a 
consequence of the NOx fee. 
5.  Summary and Conclusion 
The ongoing policy debate surrounding recent congressional proposals to cap emissions 
of multiple pollutants, including SO2 and NOx, from the electricity sector begs the question of the 
level at which these emissions should be capped.  From the perspective of economic efficiency, 
                                                 
15 The cost of existing controls is commingled with capital costs in our model. Extrapolating the capital and 
operating costs of the new controls to existing controls implies pollution controls for SO2 and NOx of $1.47/MWh in 
the baseline, compared to $2.96/MWh with the efficient fees. In fact, the cost of controls has fallen and the capital 
cost of previous controls was greater than those shown for the choice of compliance in the model.  Furthermore, 
other costs—such as fuel washing, low NOx burners, and controls on direct particulates—are already widely used 
but not included in these estimates. The opportunity cost of emissions is reflected in permit costs of $0.5/MWh in 
the baseline, and they are reflected in emission fees of $1.3/MWh under the efficient fee policy. The cost of fuel 
switching is not included in these estimates. Resources for the Future  Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer 
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the answer is that level at which the marginal benefits of further emission reductions are offset 
by the marginal costs.   
We use the Haiku electricity model and the TAF integrated assessment model to identify 
these levels.  We find that the efficient emission fee for SO2 is between $4,700 and $1,800 per 
ton, which will yield between 0.9 and 3.1 million tons of emissions in the year 2010.  For NOx, 
the best estimate of the efficient emission tax lies between $1,200 and $700 per ton, which yields 
emissions of between 1.0 and 2.8 million tons.  In comparison, the emission targets of the Bush 
administration and Jeffords proposals are in the higher end of the range estimated by our 
research for SO2, and closer to the middle of the range for NOx.  In general, our results suggest 
the emission caps included in the congressional and administration proposals are within the 
range of emissions that can be supported by current knowledge.   
Reductions in SO2 emissions are achieved through a mix of responses to the emissions 
fee, including fuel switching among types of coal and from coal to natural gas, increased 
retrofitting of existing coal-fired capacity with SO2 scrubbers, and a small reduction in electricity 
demand.  Most of the emission reductions for complying with the efficient NOx cap come from 
installing post combustion controls, the majority of which is SCR.  Considered individually, 
there is little fuel switching that results from the NOx fees.  When considered in tandem, the 
efficient policies lead to an increase in average electricity price of 4% and total electricity 
demand decreases by about 1%.  The fuel switching to natural gas and the small reduction in 
electricity demand, most of which is attributable to the SO2 fee, produces ancillary reductions in 
CO2 emissions of almost 5% of baseline levels in 2010 under the efficient policy. 
Our findings are subject to three important caveats.  First, as noted previously, we 
estimate only the static efficiency for a single point in time (2010), rather than an optimal path 
over time.  Second, we do not include restrictions on mercury emissions in the analysis and these 
restrictions are included in both legislative proposals.  Imposing caps on mercury will change the 
opportunity costs of reducing emissions of both pollutants.  For SO2, the costs will tend to shift 
down and this suggests that the optimal level of the SO2 cap could be even lower than suggested 
here when mercury restrictions are taken into account.  Third, we also do not consider the effects 
of a constraint on CO2 emissions, which is a feature of the Jeffords bill.  Because there are no 
post-combustion control options for reducing CO2, a constraint on CO2 emissions would lead to 
more fuel switching from coal to natural gas.  For SO2, we suspect that introducing a CO2 cap 
would lower the opportunity costs of control and, consequently, the level of the optimal cap 
below that indicated in this analysis. Resources for the Future  Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer 
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Our results suggest two potential modifications of basic national cap-and-trade programs, 
modifications that are, to some extent, present in the two main proposals.  The first is a finer 
geographic resolution to the trading program.  We find there is substantial regional variation in 
the benefits per ton that are achieved by reducing pollution, suggesting that a regionally 
differentiated policy could yield greater net benefits than a uniform national policy.  In a national 
policy, pollution permits trade at a one-to-one ratio; in a regionally differentiated policy, region-
specific permits would trade within the region at a three-to-two ratio, but across regions at a ratio 
set to the estimated ratio of marginal benefits (damages from pollution).  For example, as shown 
in Figure 3, western sulfur permits might trade in a two-for-one ratio with eastern permits.  In 
contrast, the Bush and Jeffords proposals each have separate regions for one or another of the 
pollutants, but do not include trading across regions.16  Nonetheless, our analysis suggests that 
the efficient national emissions cap produces significant decreases in both nitrate and sulfate 
particulate concentrations in every state compared to the baseline. 
The second potential modification is a hybrid tax and permit policy.  As shown in 
Figure 2a, the marginal costs of sulfur abatement around the efficient point are very steep.  In 
such a setting, taxes are more efficient than cap-and-trade mechanisms when there is some 
uncertainty in the marginal cost of abatement (Weitzman 1974), which is very likely over the 
large range of abatement contemplated.  However, cap-and-trade policies are generally more 
realistic measures politically.  A hybrid mechanism that allocates permits and then allows 
additional taxed emissions beyond the permit level (Roberts and Spence, 1976), would achieve 
both advantages.17  It would also prevent ruinously high costs to industry in the event that the 
marginal cost curve is understated.  Such a hybrid mechanism is included in the Bush proposal.   
Even without such embellishments, the tradable permits for SO2 introduced in the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments have brought air pollution policy closer to an efficient, least-cost 
way to achieve a given pollution target.  Our research suggests that tightening those targets and 
introducing a national aggregate cap for NOx, along the magnitudes suggested in the current 
debate, would come close to achieving an efficient level of pollution as well.   
 
                                                 
16 The Jeffords proposal also allows for the possibility of nonuniform trading ratios when upwind sources are found 
to affect areas that fail to attain national ambient air quality standards. 
17 Pizer (2001) has looked at a hybrid policy, often called a “safety valve,” in the context of a stock externality. Resources for the Future  Banzhaf, Burtraw, and Palmer 
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Figure 1.  Example of Marginal Benefits and Marginal Costs of SO2 Abatement  
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Figure 2a.  Smoothed Marginal Benefits and Marginal Costs of SO2 Abatement 
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Figure 2b. Smoothed Marginal Benefits and Marginal Costs of NOx Abatement  
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Figure 3.  Average Benefits to the Nation Per Ton of Emission Reduction in Each State.  
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Figure 4.  Reduction in SO2 Emissions by State from SO2 Cap of 1.2 Million Tons 
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Figure 5.  Reductions in PM10 Concentrations by State from SO2 Cap of 1.1 Million Tons 
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Table 1. Compliance Strategies and Costs   
1999 dollars in 2010  Efficient Policy  Percent of Baseline 
SO2 Tax ($/ton)  3,500  N/A
φ 
NOx Tax ($/ton) 1,100  N/A
ψ 
Emission Controls on Steam Coal (thousand MW) 
SO2 278  244% 
NOx   302  156% 
Annualized Pollution Control Cost
π (billion dollars) 
SO2 7.48  N/A
π 
NOx   4.36  N/A
π 
Generation (million MWh)    
Total   4,247  98.9% 
Coal 2,113  93% 
Gas   886  115% 
Nuclear 768  104% 
Electricity Price ($/MWh)    
Total 67.6  104% 
Opportunity Cost
ξ SO2    0.92  307% 
Opportunity Cost
ξ NOx   0.39  193% 
Control Cost
π SO2   1.87  N/A
ρ 
Control Cost
π NOx 1.09  N/A
ρ 
Gas Price ($/mmBtu) 3.33  109% 
Emissions (million short tons)    
NOx 1.410  30.4% 
SO2 1.051  11.4% 
CO2   2,982  95.1% 
φ SO2 permit costs in the baseline for Title IV compliance are $102/ton. 
ψ  NOx permit costs in the baseline for a seasonal policy in the SIP Call region are $1,730/ton. 
τ  Includes cost of reserve. 
ξ  Cost of emission fees embedded in electricity price. 
π  Includes annual capital and O&M cost.  
ρ  Values are not reported as changes from baseline because cost of pollution controls are 
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